I. INTRODUCTION
Varieties of capitalism is an influential newish theory of political economy. It posits that there are different types of capitalism. In particular, it differentiates between liberal and co-ordinated market economies, although there are other variants as well.
In liberal market economies, firms coordinate their behaviour with other economic actors using the market mechanism. Employees are hired and fired as part of a fluid labour market. Capital is acquired in financial markets that are sensitive to current profits and there is a market for corporate control incentivising firms to maximise their share prices. Any cooperation with other firms may be conditioned by strict competition rules and contract laws that favour literal interpretation of written contracts. By contrast, in coordinated market economies, non-market based methods of coordination are also used. Employees often enjoy greater job security and unions play an important role in wage setting. Capital may be provided by banks and other long term investors and is not purely focused on quarterly earnings. Various networks of business associations and contract laws that support more open relational contracting allow cooperation among firms to develop.
Intriguingly, both variants of capitalism feel under threat as a result of European integration. Liberal market economies are essentially worried about positive integration, harmonisation that would stifle the market-based operation of their systems. For coordinated market economies, there is a wider set of perceived threats ranging from the direct threats posed by negative integration and neoliberal directives to the more indirect worry about a possible race to the bottom. The purpose of the current Paper is to explore whether the two paradigm variants of capitalism are indeed threatened by the integration project, and how the Lisbon Treaty affects the picture. It will be argued descriptively that both types of capitalism can continue to exist in the European Union, and normatively that it is vital that the EU does not fundamentally endanger them.
II. VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM
The theory of varieties of capitalism falls within the tradition of comparative capitalism, and was posited in its classic form by Peter Hall and David Soskice in
2001.
1 It has proven extremely influential. Writers in the field of political economy often situate their arguments within the analytical framework provided by this theory, or expressly argue against varieties of capitalism, seeking to set up alternative approaches.
2
Hall and Soskice regard companies as crucial actors in capitalist economies, and take a relational view of them. Companies seek to exploit and enhance their ability to develop, produce and distribute products and services profitably. To do this, they need to coordinate successfully with a range of other actors, such as employees, investors, and other companies. Coordination is particularly important in five spheres: industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and internal coordination with employees. There are different ways these This in turn is made possible by institutions such as dense business networks that allow potential investors to inform themselves reliably on a firm's record and projects. By contrast, in liberal market economies, such as the US and more broadly the Anglo-Saxon countries, the financial system based on stock markets with a lively market for corporate control forces firms to concentrate more on current earnings and share price, and as a result imposes a shorter time horizon on the management. In coordinated market economies, the internal structure of firms tends to favour consensual decision-making which includes the voice of the employees and considers also other stakeholders, while in liberal market economies authority is concentrated in the top management and focuses on shareholder value, allowing for a rapid release of workforce. In coordinated market economies production strategies often rely on loyal highly skilled workers with considerable autonomy, capable of realising continuous improvements in products and production. Industrial relations systems support this by equalising wages to discourage poaching and by protecting workers against layoffs, while education and training systems allow workers to achieve industry-or even firmspecific skills. This may be further reinforced by generous unemployment benefits that function as an insurance policy for workers who develop specific skills. By contrast, in liberal market economies firms hire and fire workers more readily on a fluid labour market, education and training systems provide more general skills that may be useful beyond the confines of a particular firm or industry, and low levels of social benefits may further enhance the flexibility of the labour markets. Accordingly, the firms may be able to take quick advantage of new opportunities, but will find it more difficult to pursue production strategies that are based on cooperative highly skilled employees. The worries relate to positive harmonisation. Liberal market economies organise coordination through the marketplace. The better markets function, the more effective will liberal market economies be. Accordingly, deregulation and strengthening of markets are often the best policies for these countries. However, if the EU engages in harmonisation, in particular in the field of worker protection, it may interfere with the functioning of the market mechanism. It may render labour markets more rigid and hinder the rapid redeployment of workers from one activity to another that is one of the principal advantages of liberal market economies. The same concern can apply in other markets as well, but has been most frequently expressed in the context of labour.
Further, there is a concern that two factors may render the EU prone to adopting such laws. First, the EU institutions, in particular the Commission and the European Parliament, may wish to use such regulation as an instrument for extending their own and the Union's power. In other words, the fear is that the real agenda is the expansion of integration, rather than the protection of workers or whatever substantive policy goal is cited. , which was initially strongly criticised by the UK and the industry. Following a lengthy legislative process that involved numerous compromises, even the Alternative Investment Management Association was able to greet the 'considerable progress' that had been made http://www.aima.org/en/announcements/aima-statement-on-aifmd.cfm. 35 Under the ordinary legislative procedure, a majority of national parliaments can also bring the legislator to consider the issue of subsidiarity before the first reading has been concluded, at which point 55% of the members of the Council or a majority of the votes cast in the European Parliament can reject the proposal forthwith.
the attitudes and capabilities of national parliaments, but it at least offers a promise of a political solution to the problem of subsidiarity review. Under the new procedure, the political institutions are expected to take charge, with national parliaments, who have the most to lose in institutional terms from any mission creep, acting as subsidiarity watchdogs.
36
As an aside, it should be noted that the EU experience is remarkably similar to that of the United States. In the US, the Supreme Court has in particular interpreted the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution broadly, allowing for the adoption of federal legislation except in the most far-fetched cases. 37 The US experience suggests that it is generally not easy to develop formal, legal, subjectmatter based safeguards. Instead, the onus has been on the political system with its inbuilt checks and balances and procedural safeguards to protect state autonomy. In conclusion, at the moment it seems difficult to argue that the integration project constitutes a fundamental threat to liberal market economies. In particular the political safeguards offered by the Treaties are likely to protect them from any fargoing interference with the flexibility of their labour markets.
rather than binding legal provisions.
Different systems are exposed to each other, hopefully with the result of mutual learning and sharing of best practices, but are not forced to alter their characteristics. 
IV. COORDINATED MARKET ECONOMIES UNDER THREAT?
The threats allegedly facing coordinated market economies are more multifaceted.
Not only is there the danger posed by neoliberal positive harmonisation, but also the challenge of negative integration in the form of far-going case law of the Court and, indirectly, the worry about a possible race to the bottom.
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In the context of positive harmonisation, the original proposals for the Services Directive and the Takeover Directive are sometimes held up as illustrations of the threats the integration project poses to coordinated market economies. 42 The
proposed Services Directive contained a country-of-origin principle that was expected, among other things, to undermine health, labour and environmental standards, and lead to invasion of France by Polish plumbers. 43 The Takeover
Directive proposal sought to limit defensive measures such as poison pills that Boards of target companies are prone to utilise to defend their positions.
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While the source of this threat is the same as that supposedly facing liberal market economies, the legal situation is different. The adoption of liberalising directives is undoubtedly within the competence of the EU. In most cases, the ordinary legislative procedure is employed, and national vetoes do not play a role.
Although the principle of subsidiarity does formally apply, due to the shared nature of the internal market competence, If market-oriented neoliberal directives are adopted by the EU legislature, the institutions and procedures that have allowed non-market based coordination to flourish may have to be set aside, with negative consequences for this variety of capitalism. thread is the same. There is potential for the Court's case law to disrupt the established national coordination mechanisms, but such a disruption is by no means certain. Instead, the case law is highly fact-specific, in particular as the result of the doctrine of justifications and proportionality. As long as a coordination mechanism serves a rational purpose in a non-protectionist manner, it is likely to emerge unscathed from the Court's scrutiny. 59 Further, much of the case law arises under
Article 267 TFEU, which allocates the interpretation of EU law to the Court, but reserves its application to the referring national court. As a result, the decisive balancing exercise is in many cases carried out by a national court within the broad parameters established by the Court of Justice.
60
The final possible challenge is more indirect. The worry is that the opening of the markets that economic integration entails creates a race to the bottom, forcing countries to deregulate in order to attract inward investment and avoid capital flight.
While this concern is frequently mentioned, the empirical evidence for it is sparse.
Most commentators seem to agree that very little competitive deregulation is actually taking place.
This serves as a further safeguard against the danger of fundamental disruptions to key national institutions. General Cruz Villalón opined that:
As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, when working conditions constitute an overriding reason relating to the public interest justifying a derogation from the freedom to provide services, they must no longer be interpreted strictly. In so far as the protection of workers is a matter which warrants protection under the Treaties themselves, it is not a simple derogation from a freedom, still less an unwritten exception inferred from caselaw. To the extent that the new primary law framework provides for a mandatory high level of social protection, it authorises the Member States, for the purpose of safeguarding a certain level of social protection, to restrict a freedom, and to do so without European Union law's regarding it as something exceptional and, therefore, as warranting a strict interpretation. 74 Normatively, it can be argued that the European Union should avoid imposing a single model of capitalism on its Member States. Rather, it should ensure that both liberal and coordinated market economies can thrive within its order. This is so for a number of reasons of principle and practice. 
84
All of these factors counsel caution, both for the EU legislature and for its judiciary. It is crucial that both positive and negative integration is sensitive to potential disruptions to national production systems. Interventions in key areas, such as labour relations and corporate governance, need to be modest and carefully judged, lest the costs outweigh the benefits. Different elements of a national production system should not be viewed in isolation, but as parts of a complex interlocking organism. A production system might in some cases be destabilised by changes to one of its individual elements, no matter how sensible the changes might appear if considered without reference to the broader context. 83 Hall and Gingerich, above n 9, 470-473. 84 See also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, above n 1, 325; and Johnston, above n 47, 141-145 in the context of corporate governance.
There are reasons to be hopeful. Some of the often criticised features of the EU, such as its slow and complex decision making process and a heavy reliance on judicial institutions, may on occasion prove to be strengths. The EU legislative procedure involves a large number of actors, veto points and super-majority requirements, and tends to produce reflection and compromise rather than radical solutions. The current diversity among the Member States and their strong role in the system ensure that proposals harmful to any particular variety of capitalism are liable to be blocked or amended before they become the law. As regards the Court, the factspecific case-by-case decision system employed by courts in general is unlikely to produce big mistakes. 85 A judgment that is considered counterproductive will get criticised, and subsequent decisions may limit it to its facts or even overrule it, thus minimising the impact of an error. In the particular context of the EU free movement law, the flexible principle of proportionality that occupies the pride of place in this field and the role played by national courts in the preliminary reference procedure are well-suited for ensuring context-sensitive decision making. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that either the legislative or judicial institutions of the EU will pose a mortal danger to the different varieties of capitalism in Europe.
VI. CONCLUSION
To sum up, the varieties of capitalism approach to political economy argues that instead of one model of capitalism there are a number of different models, in particular liberal and coordinated varieties, which are distinguished by the different methods of coordination they utilise. Neither model is superior to the other; rather they provide advantages and disadvantages for different sectors of the economy.
Intriguingly, both varieties have felt threatened by European integration. For liberal market economies, the spectre of directives that create labour market rigidities has loomed large. For coordinated market economies, the worries have ranged from neoliberal legislation or case law to an uncontrolled race to the bottom. The analysis of the legal situation has revealed that neither variety is likely to be in mortal peril. 86 See also Callaghan, above n 20.
The political safeguards in the legislative process, the methods employed by courts in general and the Court of Justice in particular, as well as the fact that both varieties create distinctive advantages are likely to render the challenges manageable. The
Lisbon Treaty does not fundamentally alter this picture. While it does render the legislative process easier and thus promotes positive harmonisation, it contains additional safeguards for subsidiarity and offers ammunition to interest groups and parties arguing for legislation to be shaped by social considerations and for a more restrained interpretation of the European economic law. This is a good thing.
Diversity will strengthen Europe and in any case the EU lacks the legitimacy and the capacity to impose a single variety of capitalism on all EU countries. The lesson for both legislative and judicial institutions is the need for modesty and sensitivity when managing the integration process, in particular in key areas such as labour relations and corporate governance, lest the costs of disruptions to national production systems outweigh the benefits of integration.
A large unanswered question looms, though. Even if the EU as a whole can and should tolerate different varieties of capitalism, is it possible or desirable to accommodate them within the eurozone, or will it in the end prove necessary for eurozone countries to converge on a single model? Recently, a debate has been raging on a competitiveness pact that might have imposed significant constraints on eurozone members. 87 The final 'Euro Plus Pact' seems unlikely to shoehorn the participating countries into a single model. 88 The pact leaves each state free to decide which specific policy actions it wishes to undertake, and the implementation of commitments will be monitored politically by the Heads of State or Government, while the reforms that are suggested in the pact are couched in language that lacks precision. 89 For example, '[e]ach country will be responsible for the specific policy actions it chooses to foster competitiveness, but the following reforms will be given particular attention: (i) respecting national traditions of social dialogue and industrial relations, measures to ensure costs developments in line with productivity, such as: review the wage setting arrangements, and, where necessary, the degree of centralisation in the bargaining process, and the indexation mechanisms, while maintaining the autonomy of the social partners in the collective bargaining process'.
between production regimes and aggregate demand management systems. In particular, coordinated market economies may require tighter, more conservative monetary policies than liberal market economies.
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Whatever the final verdict will prove to be for the eurozone, ultimately it is of course unrealistic to think that integration will leave national systems entirely untouched even if they do not participate in the euro. Integration will inevitably disturb entrenched ways of doing things. This is not a bad thing. No system is perfect.
Economic integration entails increased competition both between companies and between regulations. This in turn creates incentives to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of national institutions. It also offers opportunities for mutual learning.
At the same time, there is a need to avoid imposing solutions on Member States from the centre unnecessarily. A deregulatory reform may work well for a liberal market economy, as it improves the dominant method of coordination in the system, but may on occasion prove a source of counterproductive disruptions for a coordinated market economy, while a policy improving non-market coordination may prove ineffective or even detrimental for a liberal market economy, which depends on flexible markets. 91 See Hall, above n 3. 92 As emphasised by Streek, above n 11.
